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THE ADMISSION OF CHEMICAL TEST
REFUSALS AFTER STATE v. NEVILLE:
DRUNK DRIVERS CANNOT TAKE THE FIFTH
SUSAN WAITE CRUMP*
I. INTRODUCTION
Nearly fifteen years ago, Justice Clark commented upon the
tragedies created by drunk drivers when he stated, "The increasing
slaughter on our highways, most of which should be avoidable, now
reaches the astounding figures only heard of on the battlefield." 1
Unfortunately, the astounding battlefield figures are dwarfed by
the more astounding figures now being heard from the nation's
highways. For example, during the war in Viet Nam, 45,000
American soldiers were killed by the enemy, 2 but during the same
period, 274,000 Americans were killed on highways as a direct
'J. D.. University of Houston, Bates College of Law: Law Clerk. JudgeJohn R. Brown, Chief
Judge. United States Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit: former District Attorney. Harris
County. Texas: former associate of Butler, Binion. Rice. Cook & Knapp: Assistant Professor of
Law. South Texas College of Law. Houston. Texas.
I. Breithaupt v. Abram. 352 U.S. 432. 439 (1957).
2. Oversight into the Administratton of State and Local Court Adjudication of Driving While Intoxicated:
Hearing Before the Subcomm. on Courts of the Senate Comm. on the Judiciary. 97th Cong.. 1st Sess. 93 (1982)
(statement of Dr. Alasdair Conn. Medical Director. Maryland Institute for Emergency Medical
Systems, Baltimore, Md.) [hereinafter cited as Senate D47 Hearings].
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result of alcohol intoxication. 3 More than 26,000 persons died in
1980, and more than 750,000 were injured as a result of collisions
in which one or more of the participants had been drinking.4 In
addition to the loss of lives, drunk drivers are responsible for more
than five billion dollars in damages each year.5
Paradoxically, it is often more difficult to prosecute a driving
while intoxicated (DWI) case than it is to prosecute other crimes. 6
For example, jurors more readily identify with a DWI defendant
than they do with defendants accused of violent crimes. 7 Most
jurors, if not their friends and relatives, have engaged in the
prohibited conduct themselves. 8 Additionally, police officers are
often discouraged from making DWI arrests because it takes as
long as four hours for an officer to process a DWI arrestee. 9 Thus,
the crime of driving while intoxicated is steadily increasing across
the country. 10
There have been numerous attempts by various legislative
groups to keep drunk drivers off the roads and to convict them
when apprehended.II All states, for example, have enacted implied
consent laws requiring a suspected drunk driver to submit to
chemical testing of his blood, breath, or urine to determine his
blood alcohol level. 12 The result of such tests are then admissible at
3. Id.
4. Id. at 14 (statement of Rep. Michael Barnes, Md.).
5. Lauter, The Drunk Driving Blitz, 4 NAT'L L.J., Mar. 22, 1982, at 1, col. 1. See also 1 MADD
(Mothers Against Drunk Drivers), Hous. Area Chapter Newsletter, 1st quarter, 1982, at 1. The
Houston Chapter of Mothers Against Drunk Driving reported the following: Drunk driving is "a
crime that kills more than homicides, that injures more people more seriously than assaults with
deadly weapons, that does more property damage than all forgers, burglars and robbers all added
together." Id.
6. See Haddon & Blumenthal, Forward to H. Ross, DETERRING THE DRINKING DRIVER at xviii
(1981) (prosecution of drunk drivers "is riddled with escape hatches of bewildering ingeniousness,
variety, and effectiveness").
7. See id. at xiii (public is reluctant to punish the drunk driver because it may view a drunk driver
and think" '[tihere but for the grace of God go 1' ").
8. See Arenella, Schmerber and the Privilege Against Self-Incrimination: A Reappraisal, 20 AM. CRIM. L.
REV. 31, 32 n.7 (1982) ("When the testifying defendant is a respectable citizen, juries are often
reluctant to convict.").
9. See Senate DWI Hearings, supra note 2, at 50 (statement of Diane Steed, Deputy Administrator,
National Highway Traffic Safety Administration, U.S. Department of Transportation).
10. See Senate DWI Hearings, supra note 2, at 71 (testimony of Lt. Col. Johnny G. Lough, Chief,
Maryland State Police, Pikesville, Md.).
1I. E.g., N.D. CENT. CODE § 39-20-01 (1980); OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 4511.19.1 (Page Supp.
1979). California, for example, in 1981, passed a law that made a defendant's refusal admissible in
evidence in driving-while-intoxicated (DWI) cases. See CAL. VEH. CODE § 13353 (West 1981). In
1982 California reported 100 fewer alcohol related deaths than in 1981. 4 NAT'L L.J. Mar. 22, 1982,
at 22, col. 2.
12. See Note, Driving While Intoxicated and the Right to Counsel: The Case Against Implied Consent, 58
TEx. L. REV. 935, 935 n.4 (1980). "Blood alcohol" is a term used to describe the amount of alcohol
in a person's bloodstream expressed as a percentage by weight. 1 R. ERWvIN, DEFENSE OF DRUNK
DRIVING CASES § 15.04 (3d ed. 1980). Most states presume legal intoxication when a person registers
a 0.10% blood alcohol content. See Crothers, The Constitutional Dimension of Discovery in DWI Cases, 59
N.D.L. REv. 369, 371 n.9 (1983) (indicates the blood alcohol content that each state requires to
give rise to legal intoxication). A person could register a blood alcohol content of 0.10% if he
350
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trial.13 Some states have statutes that permit the prosecution to
introduce into evidence a defendant's refusal to submit to testing.
14
The admission of a defendant's refusal appears justified because
jurors are most aware of the existence of chemical testing and may
refuse to convict when such evidence is not made available by the
prosecution. If the prosecution is permitted to explain the absence
of test results, jurors would be less likely to acquit on the irrational
basis that the prosecution has produced no "scientific" evidence
for conviction. 15 Statutes that permit admission of a defendant's
refusal have faced numerous constitutional and statutory challenges
in recent years, with varying results.16 To resolve the disagreement
and to determine whether a defendant's refusal is protected by the
fifth 17 or fourteenth amendment, 18 the United States Supreme
Court granted certiorari in South Dakota v. Neville. 19
The facts of Neville present a typical DWI case. The defendant,
Mason Henry Neville, was stopped by city police after he failed to
observe a stop sign.20 According to the officers, Neville had an odor
of alcohol on his breath, he fell against his car when attempting to
get out, and he informed the officers that he had no driver's license
because it had been revoked after a previous DWI conviction. 21
When Neville was unable to perform simple field sobriety tests, 22
the officer making the stop placed Neville under arrest and read
consumed either 42 ounces of beer with a 5 % alcohol content by volume or 4.9 ounces of 86-proof
liquorwithin a one-hourperiod oftime. 1 R. ERWIN, supra, § 15.01.
13. See, e.g., N.D. CENT. CODE § 39-20-07 (5) (1980). See generally Note, supra note 12, at 944-45
(admission of test at trial establishes a presumption of guilt).
14. The following statutes for example, permit the defendant's refusal to submit to testing to be
admitted as evidence: ALA. CODE § 32-5A-194 (c) (Supp. 1980); ARiz. REV. STAT. ANN. § 28-692 (h)
(Supp. 1982-1983); DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 21, § 2749 (1974); N.D. CENT. CODE § 39-20-08 (1980).
The following statutes, for example, prohibit the use of the refusal as evidence: COLO. REv. STAT.
542-4-1202 (3) (h) (1973); MAss. GEN. LAws ANN. ch. 90, § 24 (i) (e) (West 1978).
15. See Cohen, The CaseforAdmitting Evidence ofRefusal to Take a Breath Test, 6 TEx. TECH L. REV.
927,945 (1975).
16. The following cases are examples of state court decisions that allowed admission of the
refusal into evidence: Hill v. State, 366 So. 2d 318, 321 (Ala. 1979); Campbell v. Superior Court,
106 Ariz. 542, -, 479 P.2d 685, 692 (1971); State v. Lynch, 274 A.2d 443, 444 (Del. Super. Ct.
1971); People v. Taylor, 73 Mich. App. 139, - , 250 N.W.2d 570, 572 (Ct. App. 1977); State v.
Tabisz, 129 N.J. Super. 80, -, 322 A.2d 453, 454 (Super. Ct. App. Div. 1974). The following
cases are examples of state court decisions that did not allow admission of such evidence: State v.
Anonymous, 6 Conn. Cir. Ct. 470, -, 276 A.2d 452, 455-56 (Cir. Ct. 1971); People v. Boyd, 17
Ill. App. 3d 879, 883, 309 N.E.2d 29, 32 (App. Ct. 1974); Davis v. State, 8 Md. App. 327,-, 259
A.2d 567, 569 (Ct. Spec. App. 1967); State v. Andrews, 297 Minn. 260, __, 212 N.W.2d 863,
864, cert. denied, 419 U.S. 881 (1973); Dudley v. State, 548 S.W.2d 706, 707 (Tex. Crim. App. 1977).
17. See U.S. CONST. amend. V ("No person shall be... compelled, in any criminal case, to be a
witness against himself .... ").
18. See U.S. CONsT. amend. XIV, § 1 ("No state shall... deprive any person of life, liberty or
property, without due process of law .... ").
19. 312 N.W.2d 723 (S.D. 1981), cert. granted, 102 S. Ct. 2232, 2232 (1982).
20. South Dakota v. Neville, 103 S. Ct. 916, 918 (1983).
21. Id.
22. Id. The officers asked the defendant to touch his finger to his nose and to walk a straight line,
neither of which he was able to accomplish. Id.
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him his Miranda warnings.2 3 The officer also asked Neville to
submit to a chemical test to determine his blood alcohol level in
accordance with South Dakota statutory procedure.2 4 Neville
refused, stating, "I'm too drunk, I won't pass the test." 25 The trial
court suppressed evidence of Neville's refusal, even though a recent
statutory amendment expressly permitted such evidence to be
presented to a jury.26 The South Dakota Supreme Court affirmed,
stating that Neville's refusal was "testimonial" and thus protected
by the fifth amendment to the United States Constitution 27 and its
South Dakota counterpart. 28 The court also concluded in dicta that
to admit evidence of Neville's refusal would be contrary to express
state statutory language that appears to grant all DWI suspects the
"right" to refuse testing. 29
The United States Supreme Court rejected the South Dakota
court's constitutional analysis, holding instead that the fifth
amendment did not bar admission of the defendant's refusal
23. Id. The officer read the Miranda warnings from a printed card. Id. The police officer in
Neville stated the following:
You have the right to remain silent. You don't have to talk to me unless you want to do
so. If you want to talk to me I must advise you whatever you say can and will be used
as evidence against you in court. You have the right to confer with a lawyer, and to
have a lawyer present with you while you're being questioned. If you want a lawyer
but are unable to pay for one, a lawyer will be appointed to represent you free of any
cost to you. Knowing these rights, do you want to talk to me without having a lawyer
present? You may stop talking to me at any time. You may also demand a lawyer at
any time.
Id. at 918 n. 1. See Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436, 467-73 (1966).
24. 103 S. Ct. at 918-19. See S.D. CODIFIED LAWS ANN. § 32-23-10 (1976). Section 32-23-10
provides as follows:
Any person who operates any vehicle in this state shall be deemed to have given
his consent to a chemical analysis of his blood, urine, breath or other bodily substance
for the purpose of determining the amount of alcohol in his blood ....
Such person shall be requested by said law enforcement officer to submit to such
analysis and shall be advised by said officer of his right to refuse to submit to such
analysis and . . . in the event of such refusal with respect to the revocation of such
person's driving license.
Id.
25. 103 S. Ct. at 918.
26. Id. at 919. See S.D. CODIFIED LAWS ANN. § 32-23-10.1 (Supp. 1982). Section 32-23-10.1
provides as follows:
If a person refuses to submit to chemical analysis of his blood, urine, breath or other
bodily substance, as provided in § 32-23-10, and that person subsequently stands trial
for driving while under the influence of alcohol or drugs . . . such refusal may be
admissible into evidence at the trial ....
Id.
27. See U.S. CONsT. amend. V.
28. South Dakota v. Neville, 312 N.W.2d 723, 727 (S.D. 1981), rev'd, 103 S. Ct. 916 (1983). See
S.D. CONST. art. VI, § 9 ("No person shall be compelled in any criminal case to give evidence
against himself .... ").
29. 312 N.W.2d at 724-25. See S.D. CODIFIED LAWvs ANN. § 32-23-10 (1976).
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because the refusal was not "coerced" within the meaning of the
fifth amendment.30 Nor did the Court find it fundamentally unfair
under the fourteenth amendment 3' to admit the refusal,32 although
the arresting officer failed to warn the defendant about all the
statutory consequences of his refusal. 33
The purpose of this Article is to analyze a defendant's refusal
to submit to chemical testing. The analysis is comprised of two
major issues. The first issue is whether a defendant has any state
created or absolute "right" to refuse testing, when, under state
law, he has impliedly agreed to take such a test by using the state's
highways. Although this issue was not presented to the Supreme
Court in Neville, an analysis of implied consent statutes will provide
a clearer understanding of the confusion that reigned in lower court
opinions prior to this decision. Also, state courts could attempt to
distinguish Neville by recognizing a state statutory right to refuse
testing based upon a misreading of the implied consent statutes.
Thus, a discussion of this issue is important to understand both the
Neville decision and any future state court action.
The second issue is whether any fifth or fourteenth
amendment questions remain unanswered after Neville and
Schmerber v. California. 34 The analysis of this issue will focus on the
"compulsive" and "testimonial" aspects of the fifth amendment
and will consider whether the Court has abandoned, limited, or
merely distinguished the Doyle v. Ohio35 due process limitation on
using a defendant's post-arrest silence as evidence.
3 6
30. 103 S. Ct. at 923. the majority'of the Court refused to find that a violation of the South
Dakota fifth amendment counterpart constituted an independent and adequate state ground for the
decision that precluded federal review. Id. at 919 n.5. The Court discussed the issue of an adequate
state ground because of the following language in the lower court's holding: "Since the Fifth
Amendment of the U.S. Constitution is broad enough to exclude this evidence, there is no need to
draw a distinction at this time between S.D. Const. art. VI, § 9 and the Fifth Amendment of the
U.S. Constitution." Id. (quoting Neville, 312 N.W.2d at 726 n.*). In reviewing this language, Justice
Stevens in his dissent emphasized that the state constitutional basis for the holding was sufficient to
decide the case without consideration of the federal constitutional issue. 103 U.S. at 924 (Stevens, J.,
dissenting). The majority, however, deemed the South Dakota Supreme Court's language to be
identical to the Delaware court's language in Delaware v. Prouse. Id. at 919 n.5. See Delaware v.
Prouse, 440 U.S. 648 (1979). The Delaware Supreme Court in Prouse found a fourth amendment
violation and summarily concluded that there was also a state constitutional violation. Id. at 651-53.
In Neville the Supreme Court recognized the state ground for decision to be potentially adequate but
not sufficiently independent to preclude federal review. 103 S. Ct. at 919 n.5.
31. See U.S. CONSr. amend. XIV, § 1.
32. 103 S. Ct. at 923. The Court distinguished Neville from Doyle v. Ohio. Id. See Doyle v. Ohio,
426 U.S. 610 (1976). In Doyle the Supreme Court held that the due process clause of the fourteenth
amendment forbids the use of a defendant's post-Miranda warning silence to impeach the defendant's
testimony. Id. at 618.
33. 103 S. Ct. at 918. The officers warned the defendant that he could lose his driver's license if
he refused to submit to the test. Id. The officers failed to inform him that the test results or the fact of
-refusal could be used against him at trial. Id. at 923.
34. See Schmerber v. California, 384 U.S. 757 (1966). For a discussion of Schmerber v. California,
see infra text accompanying notes 74-79.
35. See Doyle v. Ohio, 426 U.S. 610 (1976).
36. Id. at 618.
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II. THE IMPLIED CONSENT LAWS AND THE PHYSICAL
COERCION DOCTRINE: A BALANCING OF IN-
TERESTS
All states require motorists who drink to submit to chemical
testing of their blood alcohol levels under the legal theory of implied
consent. 37 The implied consent statutes, however, also contain
language recognizing a defendant's "right" to refuse testing.38 In
attempting to resolve this apparent contradiction, some state
courts, such as the South Dakota Supreme Court in Neville,39 have
held that the "right" to refuse is paramount to a defendant's duty
to submit to testing. 40 Courts reaching this conclusion seldom base
their analysis on actual legislative intent. 41 Instead, they argue that
it would be fundamentally unjust for a legislature to create a right
to refuse and then punish the exercise of that right by permitting a
jury to speculate on a defendant's possibly self-incriminating
motives for refusal. 42 In sum, such courts determine legislative
intent by reference to general fifth amendment policies.
The fact that a legislature qualifies a "right" to refuse by
allowing a jury to hear such evidence, however, is a strong
indication that the "right" was not absolute in the first place.
Clearly, a legislature has the authority to grant to a defendant less
than an absolute right to refuse testing.43 But it appears
contradictory in reason, if not in purpose, to require a defendant to
submit to testing, recognize that he has a "right" to refuse should
he so desire, and then punish the exercise of that "right" by letting
37. See Note, supra note 12, at 936 n.4 (complete listing of implied consent statutes).
38. See, e.g., OR. REV. STAT. § 487.805 (2) (1981). Section 487.805 (2) provides in part as
follows: "No chemical test of the person's breath shall be given ... if the person refuses the request
of a police officer to submit to the chemical test .... " Id. See also S.D. CODFIED LAWS ANN. § 32-23-
10 (1976). The South Dakota statute is worded in terms of the defendant's "right" to refuse testing.
See id. For the text of this provision, see supra note 24.
39. Neville, 312 N.W.2d at 726.
40. See, e.g., Duckworth v. State, 309 P.2d 1103, 1106 (Okla. Crim. App. 1957). But see State v.
Newton, 291 Or. 788 -,... 636 P.2d 393, 401, 409 (1981) (test results were admissible even
though consent was coerced by fear of adverse consequences).
41. See, e.g., Duckworth v. State, 309 P.2d at 1105 (court failed to consider legislative intent).
42. See, e.g., id. The Duckworth court stated that it would be inconsistent for the state to inform
the defendant of his right to refuse testing and then to use his refusal as evidence against him. Id. See
also State v. Neville, 312 N.W.2d at 724. The South Dakota Supreme Court in Neville offered the
following explanation for finding the right to refuse paramount to the duty to submit to testing:
Certainly it is unfair to create by statute a right not to submit to a chemical test and to
allow the accused to exercise that right and then in open court before a jury to permit
testimony concerning refusal which can all too easily work in the minds of the jury
members to the prejudice of the defendant.
Id. (quoting State v. Oswald, 90 S.D. 342, 346, 241 N.W.2d 566, 569 (1976)).
43. See, e.g., State v. Brean, 136 Vt. 147, 152, 385 A.2d 1085, 1088 (1978) (the right to refuse
testing is a matter of legislative grace or privilege).
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ajury hear evidence of his refusal.
A court has the duty to attempt to reconcile conflicting
portions of related statutes to give all provisions maximum effect. 44
Thus, a court could reconcile chemical testing provisions by
nullifying the provision that allows admission of the refusal. This
interpretation would suggest that the defendant's duty to submit to
testing is optional. Courts, however, may refuse to give effect to
one portion of conflicting legislation only after considering all
possible interpretations. 45
In attempting to reconcile the rights and duties defined by
state chemical testing laws, courts should look to the legal and
historical context in which these laws were passed. 46 The theory of
implied consent was developed in Hess v. Pawloski.47 In Hess a
resident plaintiff brought a civil suit against an out-of-state
defendant because of an automobile accident in the forum state. 48
In evaluating jurisdiction over the defendant, the Supreme Court
made a significant departure from its previous strict position of
"territoriality, ' 49 which had shackled in personam jurisdiction
since Pennoyer v. Neff,50 and dispensed with the requirement that a
nonresident defendant must be found within the forum state before
he could be sued. 51 The Court reasoned that because the state had
the right to prohibit a nonresident motorist from using its
highways, the state could condition the use of its highways by
finding that the nonresident motorist had impliedly consented to
being sued within the jurisdiction.5 2
In the wake of Hess, states soon recognized that they had the
analogous power to prohibit drinking drivers from using their
highways. 53 State legislatures reasoned that they could condition
the use of their highways upon a driver's implied consent to take a
44. See, e.g., Paice v. Maryland Racing Comm'n, 539 F. Supp. 458, 463 (D. Md. 1982); Stoner
v. Young, 533 F. Supp. 561, 566 (S.D. Mich. 1980).
45. See Hughes Air Corp. v. Public Utils. Comm'n, 644 F.2d 1334, 1338 (9th Cir. 1981).
46. See, e.g., Hess v. Pawloski, 274 U.S. 352, 356 (1927).
47. 274 U.S. 352, 356 (1927). See generally Note, supra note 12, at 937-41 (development of implied
consent laws).
48. 274 U.S. at 353.
49. Id.
50. See Pennoyer v. Neff, 95 U.S. 714 (1877). In Pennoyer the Court held that notice sent outside
a state to a nonresident is insufficient to give the forum state jurisdiction in an action against a
nonresident personally for a money judgment. Id. at 734-36. The Court in Hess considered a state's
interest in promoting the welfare of its citizens. 274 U.S. at 356. The Hess Court declared that when
a nonresident uses the highways the finding of his implied consent to service is equivalent to the
appointment of a registrar as an agent on whom process may be served. Id. at 357.
51. Hess, 274 U.S. at 356-57.
52. Id. For an analysis of the development and validity of the implied consent laws following
Hess, see Dambach, Personal Jurisdiction: Some Current Problems and Modern Trends, 5 U.C.L.A. L. REv.
198, 200-11 (1958).
53. See State v. Newton, 291 Or. 788,-., 636 P.2d 393, 397-401 (1981).
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chemical blood alcohol test in much the same way that a state could
condition an out-of-state driver's right to use its highways upon a
driver giving his implied consent to being sued in the forum state.5
4
This theory of a driver's inferred acquiescence to chemical testing
was upheld by the Supreme Court against a fourteenth amendment
challenge in Breithaupt v. Abrams55 and against fourth, fifth, and
fourteenth amendment challenges in Schmerber v. California. 56
Despite the legal validity of the implied consent theory, courts
had to determine whether a defendant could be physically
compelled to submit to testing. 57Many commentators feared that
due process might bar the forcible extraction of any bodily
substance for testing purposes, no matter how inoffensive the
process, 58 a fear that was borne out by the Supreme Court's
decision in Rochin v. California.5 9 In Rochin6" the Supreme Court
held that a police officer who compelled a suspect to disgorge
evidence of a crime violated the fourteenth amendment. 61
In 1953 the New York Legislature enacted its prototype
implied consent statute for intoxicated motorists, which authorized
the use of threatened adverse consequences to overcome a
defendant's refusal to submit to chemical testing. 62 One of the
54. See, e.g., Shutt v. MacDuff, 205 Misc. 43, 47-48, 127 N.Y.S.2d 116, 122-23 (Sup. Ct. 1954).
See generally Note, supra note 12, at 937-56 (constitutional issues in the development of implied consent
and the reasons for state adoption of implied consent statutes).
55. 352 U.S. 432, 433-40 (1957). In Breithaupt the Court held that the taking of blood from an
unconscious driver, who had been in an accident and who emitted an odor of alcohol, did not violate
the driver's right to due process. Breithaupt v. Abrams, 352 U.S. 432, 433-40 (1957).
56. 384 U.S. 757, 772 (1966). Schmerber made it clear that there was no right of a driver to
withhold consent for testing of his bodily fluids for determination of his blood alcohol level under any
constitutional theory. Schmerber v. California, 384 U.S. 757, 772 (1966). See U.S. CON5rs. amend.
IV ("The right of the people to be secure in their persons, houses, papers and effects, against
unreasonable searches and seizures, shall not be violated .... "); U.S. CONSr. amend. V ("No
person shall be ... compelled, in any criminal case, to be a witness against himself .... ); U.S.
CONsT. amend. XIV, I I ("No State shall ... deprive any person of life, liberty or property, without
due process oflaw ... "). The only limitation that Schmerber imposed was that the blood alcohol test
must be performed in a reasonable manner. 384 U.S. at 771.
57. See, e.g., Schmerber, 384 U.S. at 765.
58. See, e.g., Ruffin, Intoxication Tests and the Bill of Rights: A New Look, 2 CAL. W.L. REv. 1, 38
(1966).
59. 342 U.S. 165 (1952).
60. Rochin v. California, 342 U.S. 165, 172 (1952). In Rochin the Supreme Court held that the
police officer's conduct violated the due process clause of the fourteenth amendment because forcing
a defendant to swallow an emetic is "conduct that shocks the conscience." Id.
61. Id. The officer forced the defendant to swallow an emetic in order to cause him to regurgitate
the contents ofhis stomach. Id. at 166.
62. See N.Y. VEH. & TRAF. LAW § 71-a (McKinney 1959). In 1970 the New York Legislature
repealed § 71-a. See N.Y. VEH. & TRAF. LAW § 2014 (McKinney 1970). Section 1194(1) of the New
York Traffic and Vehicle Law provides, as did its predecessor § 71-a, that when a driver refuses to
submit to a chemical test, the state will revoke his license or permit to drive. See id. § 1194(1). The
new statute provides, however, that revocation is lawful only if the state warned the driver of this
consequence before he refused. Id. See also CommentConstitutional Law - Validity of New York Statute
Setting Out Motorists'Implied Consent to Chemical Testsfor Intoxication, 51 MICH. L. REv. 1195, 1195-1202
(1955) (analyzes constitutional problems surrounding the extraction of bodily fluids from persons by
compulsion).
356
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adverse consequences that flowed from a refusal was the suspension
of the defendant's driver's license. 63 In Breithaupt the Court viewed
this suspension as a mild form of nonphysical compulsion not
offensive to Rochin.64 The New York Legislature also used language
in the implied consent statute that implied a defendant's "right" to
refuse testing.65 In light of Rochin and the nonphysical form of
compulsion contained in the statute, 66 this "right" clearly meant a
recognition of a defendant's physical ability to refuse, rather than
any innate statutory privilege to refuse. 6
7
Thus, although there might appear to be a contradiction
between requiring a defendant to submit to chemical testing and
granting him a "right" not to submit, that dichotomy can be
resolved by recognizing the origins of the implied consent laws and
the fourteenth amendment constraints on testing procedures.
Under these circumstances a statutory "right" to refuse testing
should be interpreted as legislative recognition of a physical ability
rather than as a legislative privilege. It is possible, however, that
state courts may choose to view this issue differently. State courts
and legislatures may always grant more rights to an accused than
the federal constitution requires. 68 Should a state court choose to
find an absolute statutory "right," the court would misinterpret
legislative intent. Nor can such a position be supported by fifth
amendment policies, which were previously regarded as being
63. See N.Y. VEH. & TRAF. LAW § 71-a (McKinney 1959).
64. 352 U.S. at 435-38.
65. See N.Y. VEH. & TRAF. LAW 5 71-a (McKinney 1959). Section 71-a states in part as follows:
Ifa "person refuses to submit to such chemical test [for analysis of his breath, blood, urine, or saliva]
the test shall not be given but the commissioner shall revoke his license or permit to drive and any
nonresident operating privilege." Id.
66. See id.
67. If a legislature intended to grant a defendant an absolute "right" to refuse testing, rather
than the right to refuse to be physically coerced, then retributive license suspensions would also
violate that absolute "right." License suspensions, however, have been held to be clearly legitimate
sanctions under these circumstances. See Mackey v. Montrym, 443 U.S. 1, 19 (1979).
The distinction between prohibited physical coercion and the legal right to do an act was
explained by a dissenting state supreme court justice in State v. Jackson. State v. Jackson, - Mont.
. - 1 637 P.2d 1, 9 (1981) (Haswell, C.J., dissenting). In Jackson Chief Justice Haswell
described the difference:
This type of statute provides for mandatory consent with a freedom of refusal to
prevent unseemly struggles that are likely to arise when police and citizens fail to
appreciate the import of a common purpose. An act of this type does not contemplate a
per se right of refusal, but rather an acquiescence in refusal in the posture of avoiding
violent conflict.
Id. (Haswell, C.J., dissenting). Courts and commentators have favorably considered Chief Justice
Haswell's analysis. See Bush v. Bright, 264 Cal. App. 2d 788,-.., 71 Cal. Rptr. 123, 125 (Ct. App.
1968); Hunvald & Zimring, Whatever Happened to Implied Consent? A Sounding, 33 Mo. L. REV. 323,
323-24 (1968); Lerblance, Implied Consent to Intoxication Tests: A Flawed Concept, 53 ST. JOHN'S L. REv.
39, 49 (1978).
68. See Pruneyard Shopping Center v. Robbins, 447 U.S. 74, 81 (1980); Delaware v. Prouse,
440 U.S. 648, 652 (1979).
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foremost in the legislatures' mind when creating this "right.' '69 It
is therefore necessary to examine the fifth amendment policy
arguments considered and rejected by the Supreme Court in
Neville.
III. NARROWING THE SCOPE OF THE FIFTH AMEND-
MENT: LESSER FORMS OF COMPULSION AND
TESTIMONIAL COMMUNICATION
A. COERCION AND THE PRIVILEGE: To TALK, BALK, OR LIE
The fifth amendment privilege against self-incrimination
provides that "[n]o person . .. shall be compelled, in any criminal
case, to be a witness against himself.' '70 The primary requirements
of the amendment's protection can be found in the word
"compelled" and the phrase "to be a witness against himself." 7' A
broad interpretation of these expressions would prohibit the state
from using a defendant's fingerprints as evidence against him
because the taking of the prints were, in a sense, against the
defendant's will.72 A more reasonable interpretation would protect
a defendant's statements that are truly the product of psychological
or physical coercion. 73
The extent to which a defendant must provide the prosecution
with potentially incriminating evidence revealing his blood alcohol
level was addressed by the Court in Schmerber.74 In Schmerber the
Court made it clear that a state could force a defendant to submit to
a blood alcohol test without violating the defendant's fifth
amendment right against self-incrimination. 7- Presumably, the
procedure must comply with the due process standards announced
in Rochin. 76 An issue left undecided, however, was whether the fifth
69. See Neville, 312 N.W.2d at 725.
70. U.S. CONST. amend. V.
71. SeeArenella, supra note 8, at 36.
72. Cf. United States v. Wolfish, 525 F.2d 457, 461 (2d Cir. 1975) (no fifth amendment
violation occurred when an expert testified that the defendant attempted to hide his guilt in a
handwriting exemplar).
73. See8J. WIGMORE, EVIENCE § 2250 (McNaughten rev. ed. 1961).
74. Schmerber v. California, 384 U.S. 757, 760-65 (1966).
75. Id. at 765. The Court concluded that a defendant had no right to protect "real and physical
evidence" such as a blood sample, as opposed to "testimonial" evidence, such as oral statements. Id.
at 764. The Court also rejected a fourth and fourteenth amendment challenge to the involuntary
taking of a defendant's blood sample. Id. at 772. See U.S. CONST. amend. IV ("The right of the
people to be secure in their persons . . . against unreasonable searches and seizures, shall not be
violated. ... ); U.S. CONST. amend. XIV, § 1 ("No state shall . . . deprive any person of life,
liberty or property without due process oflaw .... ").
76. See Rochin-v. California, 342 U.S. 165, 172 (1952). In Rochin the Supreme Court stated that
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amendment would protect a defendant if the state attempted to
show that he testimonially incriminated himself when told he was to
be tested. 77 The Court provided no standard to resolve, for
example, whether a state may introduce into evidence a refusal to
submit to chemical testing if that refusal consisted of a defendant's
head shake or a statement that he would not cooperate. 78 In an
ambiguous footnote, the Court in Schmerber explained the dilemma
as follows:
If it wishes to compel persons to submit to such attempts
to discover evidence, the State may have to forgo the
advantage of any testimonial products of administering the
test - products which would fall within the privilege.
Indeed, there may be circumstances in which the pain,
danger, or severity of an operation would almost
inevitably cause a person to prefer confession to
undergoing the "search," and nothing we say today
should be taken as establishing the permissibility of
compulsion in that case. 79
In contrast to the ambiguity of the Court's footnote in
Schmerber, the Supreme Court in Neville stated that a defendant's
refusal to submit to chemical testing was not "compelled" under
the fifth amendment and thus not protected, even if it incidentally
involves a defendant's communication of his guilt. 80  It is
undeniable, however, that a defendant, when asked to submit to
chemical testing, will be placed in a difficult position. If he submits,
scientific measurements may show him to be guilty. If he refuses,
his refusal may be taken as evidence of his guilt by a jury. Thus, in
one sense, Neville allows a state to place a defendant in a position
that compels him to choose a lesser form of incrimination. This is
similar to the "trilemma" noted by courts81 and commentators 82 in
the prohibited procedure was conduct that "shocks the conscience." Id.
77. See 384 U.S. at 765. In Schmerber the defendant failed to object to the admission of his refusal
as evidence. Id. at 765 n.9.
78. See id. at 765. The Court stated that because the defendant was unconscious when the test
was administered "'[n]ot even a shadow of testimonial compulsion upon or enforced communication
by the accused was involved." Id.
79. Id. at 765 n.9.
80. Neville, 103 S. Ct. at 923.
81. See, e.g., id. at 922. The Neville Court discussed the classic example of cruel "trilemma,"
when the State tells a defendant at trial to testify. The defendant has three choices: he could
incriminate himself and risk conviction, testify falsely and risk perjury, or decline to testify and risk
contempt. Id.
82. See Westen & Mandell, To Talk, to Balk, or to Lie: The Emerging Fifth Amendment Doctrine of the
"Preferred Response, " 19 AM. CRIM. L. Rav. 521, 523-27 (1982).
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which the state forcibly places a defendant in a situation of either
"talking, balking or lying." The fifth amendment under such
circumstances, however, would be meaningless if a defendant did
not have the right to remain silent.8 3
In rejecting the implied "trilemma" analysis as it applies to
the facts in Neville, the Court recognized a fundamental limitation:
fifth amendment policies only protect against incriminating results
that flow from constitutionally protected choices.8 4  Unlike
situations in which a defendant has a constitutional right to remain
silent at trial and thus not incriminate himself,85 a defendant is
lawfully required to submit to chemical testing and is not protected
by the Constitution when he refuses. 86  The Court thus
distinguished Neville from cases such as Griffin v. California,87 in
which a prosecutor violated a defendant's fifth amendment right to
remain silent at trial by impermissibly commenting upon that right
to ajury, 88 and found this line of cases inappropriate.
The Court's view in this regard is persuasive. In commenting
upon the coercion aspect of the fifth amendment, the Court in
Miranda v. Arizona89 stated the following: "Our accusatory system
of criminal justice demands that the government seeking to punish
an individual produce the evidence against him by its own labors,
rather than by the cruel expedient of compelling it from his own
mouth. "90 Originally, the coercion aspect of the amendment
barred admission of statements that were coerced from a
defendant, either by physical or psychological means, because the
statements would probably be false and unreliable. 91 The better
and more modern view is, however, that coerced confessions are
excluded from evidence primarily to protect the defendant's fifth
amendment right against self-incrimination, regardless of the truth
or falsity of the confession. 92
The Court in Neville did not find any physically coercive
83. See Westen, Order of Proof: An Accused's Right to Control the Timing and Sequence of Evidence in His
Defense, 66 CALIF. L. REV. 935, 939-59 (1978).
84. 103 S. Ct. at 923.
85. See Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436, 458-65 (1966).
86. See Schmerber, 384 U.S. at 765.
87. Neville, 103 S. Ci. at 921 n.10. See Griffin v. California, 380 U.S. 609 (1965). In Neville the
,Supreme Court held that "[u]nlike the defendant's situation in Griffin, a person suspected of drunk
driving has no constitutional right to refuse to take a blood-alcohol test. The specific rule of Griffin is
thus inapplicable." Neville, 103 S. Ct. at 921 n. 10.
88. Griffin, 380 U.S. at 615.
89. 384 U.S. 436 (1966).
90. Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436, 460 (1966).
91. See id. at 465-66; Murphy v. Waterfront Comm'n, 378 U.S. 52, 55 (1964) (Supreme Court
feared that self-incriminating statements would be elicited by "inhumane treatment and abuses").
92. See Butler v. State, 493 S.W.2d 190, 197 n.5 (Tex. Crim. App. 1973).
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element present in the administration of a chemical test. 93 The
Court recognized that the blood alcohol test was "safe, painless and
commonplace.' '94 Moreover, the procedures are considerably less
intrusive than those used to obtain the contents of a defendant's
stomach in Rochin95 and are not calculated to force a person into
confessing his guilt rather than enduring a painful alternative.
96
Although it could be argued that there are persons for whom a
blood test would be dangerous, such as hemophiliacs, statutes
generally offer a defendant a choice of tests to avoid this unlikely
problem. 97 The same rationale would apply when the state
undertakes to obtain a breath test. The equipment is generally
reliable, 98 and operators must be trained. 99 The defendant need
only avoid physical resistance and engage in normal bodily
functions. 00 These procedures are distinguishable from the
practice of a corrupt or lazy police officer who beats a confession
out of a defendant. In addition, when the state offers to test the
defendant's blood alcohol content, it does not seek to coerce the
defendant, psychologically or physically, into refusing so that it can
use his refusal against him at trial. 101 The value of a refusal to the
state is far less than that of a positive and substantial blood alcohol
test result.
Although not noted by the Court in Neville, this same
reasoning has been applied by several courts in cases involving a
defendant's refusal to furnish other types of physical evidence not
protected by the Constitution, such as handwriting, 10 2 voice
identification exemplars, 10 3 and attendance at a lineup. 10 4 When a
defendant is clearly put to a choice between incriminating himself
by supplying such a sample or incriminating himself by refusing to
comply, courts have held refusals admissible, despite fifth
93. 103 S. Ct. at 923.
94. Id.
95. See Rochin, 342 U.S. at 166-67.
96. See Schmerber, 384 U.S. at 765 n.9.
97. See, e.g., S.D. CODIFED LAWS ANN. § 32-23-10 (1976) (defendant may consent to analysis of
his blood, urine, breath, or other bodily substance).
98. See L. TAYLOR, DRUNK DRIVING DEFENSE § 5.6 (1981).
99. Seeid. S5.7.1.
100. See id.
101. See Neville, 103 S. Ct. at 923; People v. Ellis, 65 Cal. 2d 529, -. , 421 P.2d 393, 397, 55
Cal. Rptr. 385, 389 (1966).
102. See United States v. Wolfish, 525 F.2d 457, 461 (2d Cir. 1975), cert. denied, 423 U.S. 1059
(1976); United States v. Nix, 465 F.2d 90, 93 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, 409 U.S. 1119 (1972).
103. See United States v. Wolfish, 525 F.2d at 461; Higgins v. Wainwright, 424 F.2d 177, 178
(5th Cir. 1970).
104. See United States v. Wade, 388 U.S. 218, 221-23 (1967). See generally 8J. WIGMORE, supra
note 73, § 2265 (lists various categories of physical evidence the state may obtain from a defendant
without violating his constitutional rights).
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amendment claims. 105 Permitting a jury to hear of a defendant's
refusal to provide all types of physical evidence, which he has no
constitutional right to withhold, including a sample of his blood,
breath, or urine, sets one unified and clear standard under the fifth
amendment.
As recognized by the Court, a defendant might prefer to avoid
a situation in which his guilt was determined by a scientific
method. 106 Often, a decision to take or refuse a chemical test will be
made without prior consultation with an attorney, and it will not be
easy or pleasant, especially when the defendant's reasoning
faculties have been blurred by alcohol. Nonetheless, the Court has
made it clear that the fifth amendment protects against state
coercion only when the defendant has lawful and constitutional
choices to make. 107
B. THE TESTIMONIAL ASPECT OF THE PRIVILEGE
Both courts and commentators, in considering the
constitutional issues involved in Neville, have focused on whether a
defendant's refusal constitutes "testimonial" communication'0 8 as
defined in Schmerber.'0 9 In Schmerber the defendant, who was
unconscious while an incriminatory blood sample was taken,
argued that the state was barred from obtaining evidence of his
guilt that required him to participate, even minimally." 0 The
Supreme Court, however, refused to take such a broad view of the
scope of the privilege. "' Instead, Justice Brennan, speaking for the
majority, held that only "testimonial" evidence is protected,
whereas "real" or "physical" evidence, such as a blood sample, is
105. See United States v. Wade, 388 U.S. at 221-23: United States v. Nix, 465 F.2d at 94;
Higgins v. Wainwright, 424 F.2d at 178.
106. 103 S. Ct. at 923.
107. Id.
108. See, e.g.. State v. Andrews. 297 Minn. 260, _. 212 N.W.2d 863, 864-65 (1973), cert.
denied. 419 U.S. 881 (1974): Arenella. supira note 8. at 36-48.
109. See Schmerber. 384 U.S. at 761. In a footnote the Schmerber Court discussed the terms
"testimonial" and "communicative." Id. at 761 n.5. The Court stated the following:
Of course, all evidence received in court is "testimonial" or "communicative" if these
words are thus used. But the Fifth Amendment relates only to acts on the part of the
person to whom the privilege applies, and we use these words subject to the same
limitations. A nod or head-shake is as much a "testimonial" or "communicative" act
in this sense as are spoken words. But the terms as we use them do not apply to
evidence of acts noncommunicative in nature as to the person asserting the privilege.
even though. as here, such acts are compelled to obtain the testimony of others.
Id.
110. Id. at 758-59.
111. Id. at 764.
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not. 112 Left undecided, however, was the extent to which the fifth
amendment would protect a defendant if the prosecution attempted
to show that the defendant incriminated himself when told he was
to be tested. 1 3 In other words, the Court in Schmerber did not
indicate whether it would consider a refusal to be "testimonial," or
whether it would find admissible a statement similar to Neville's -
"I'm too drunk, I won't pass the test" - regardless of the
admissibility of the test results.
Based upon frequent references in Schmerber to other examples
of assertive conduct and upon the cryptic footnote number nine, 114
the South Dakota Supreme Court in Neville concluded that a refusal
to submit to chemical testing is not only compelled, but is also a
"tacit or overt expression and communication of a defendant's
thoughts. ' 115 Therefore, the court held that such evidence is
"testimonial" as that term was defined in Schmerber. 116
The Supreme Court rejected this analysis, suggesting1 17 that it
found more persuasive the explanation by Justice Traynor in People
v. Ellis. 118 Justice Traynor likened evidence of the refusal to that of
flight, escape, or intentional destruction of incriminating
evidence.11 9 He stated that "by acting like a guilty person, a man
does not testify to his guilt but merely exposes himself to the
drawing of inferences from circumstantial evidence of his state of
mind." 1 20 Such acts have been described by courts as admissions
by conduct rather than as testimonial statements. 121
Although strained to some degree, Traynor's analogy is
helpful. The alcohol in a person's blood stream metabolizes at the
approximate rate of 0.02 % per hour. 122 When a defendant refuses
to take a breath, blood, or urine test, he intentionally destroys
evidence through his metabolic process. Permitting the refusal into
evidence under these circumstances might be analogous to allowing
112. Id.
113. Id. at 765 n.9.
114. See id. at 761, 764, 765 n.9.
115. Neville, 312 N.W.2d at 726.
116. Id.
117. Neville, 103 S. Ct. at 921. The Court falls short of basing its opinion upon a finding that
Neville's refusal was not a testimonial act because determination of that issue was unnecessary once
the Court failed to find that the refusal was compelled. Id. at 923.
118. 65 Cal. 2d 529, 421 P.2d 393, 55 Cal. Rptr. 385 (1966).
119. People v. Ellis, 65 Cal. 2d 529, -, 421 P.2d 393, 397, 55 Cal. Rptr. 385, 389 (1966). In
a companion case, People v. Sudduth, the California Supreme Court used the Ellis rationale to allow
the admission of a refusal to take a breath test. People v. Sudduth, 65 Cal. 2d 543, -, 421 P.2d
401, 403, 55 Cal. Rptr. 393, 395 (1966).
120. People v. Ellis, 65 Cal. 2d at -, 421 P.2d at 397-98, 55 Cal. Rptr. at 389-90.
121. See, e.g., Newhouse v. Misterly, 415 F.2d 514, 517-18 (9th Cir. 1969); Commonwealth v.
Robinson, 229 Pa. Super. 131, -, 324 A.2d 441, 449-51 (Super. Ct. 1974).
122. See A. CEDERBAUMS, SCIENTIFIC AND EXPERT EVIDENCE IN CRIMINAL ADVOCACY 436 (1975).
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the prosecution to show that a defendant, when confronted with a
warrant to search his premises for contraband, swallowed narcotics
to avoid detection in the hope that his body would metabolize the
incriminating evidence. 123
State courts could, however, substantially erode this theory by
finding an absolute statutory right to refuse testing. If a defendant
is given a lawful state created choice under such circumstances, a
jury might interpret a defendant's failure to explain his refusal as
evidence of his guilt, which would undermine his right to remain
silent. 124 It is possible that the Court wished to avoid this dilemma
and thus declined to base its decision on the theory that a refusal
was not "testimonial. "125
The Court was not required to reach the "testimonial" issue
once it found that the refusal was not "coerced" within the
meaning of the fifth amendment. 126 For example, a spontaneous,
uncoerced utterance by a defendant in custody is not protected by
the fifth amendment, even if it is incriminating and
"testimonial." 1 27 By refusing to find coercion, the Court avoided
the quagmire of determining whether a nod of a defendant's head is
testimonially distinguishable from an affirmative "no," 128 and thus
any response by a defendant in refusing the test may come into
evidence, including the damaging statement, "I'm too drunk, I
123. Cf. Rochin, 342 U.S. at 166 (Supreme Court reversed a conviction for possession of
morphine because after the defendant had swallowed morphine capsules in an attempt to avoid
detection, police officers ordered a doctor to force an emetic solution into his stomach against his
will).
Another purpose ofadmitting into evidence a defendant's refusal to submit to testing is to avoid
the confusion, misrepresentation, and prejudice to the State that would result from its failure to
explain to a jury the absence of test results. See, e.g., State v. Andrews, 297 Minn. 260, -, 212
N.W.2d 863, 867 (Peterson, J., dissenting), cert. denied, 419 U.S. 881 (1973). The dissent offered the
following explanation for allowing admission of the refusal:
The concept of the implied-consent law had by 1971 been more widely accepted than
at the time of its first enactment, with increased public awareness of its routine use.
This being so, the legislature [in repealing a statutory provision making evidence of
refusal inadmissible] could well have intended to avoid a jury's speculating that a
chemical test had been given to the defendant but that the absence of any evidence
concerning the result indicated that the results were negative.
297 Minn. at __, 212 N.W.2d at 867 (Peterson,J., dissenting).
It is a general principle of evidence that either party may explain the absence of evidence that
jurors normally expect to be present. See Schumacher v. United States, 216 F.2d 780, 787-88 (8th
Cir. 1954), cert. denied, 348 U.S. 951 (1955). Jurors are universally aware of the availability of
chemical tests to determine intoxication and can hardly escape inferring either that a test was not
offered or that its results were favorable to the defendant ifno-test results were presented by the State.
The doubt created by the unexplained absence of test results is often, by itself, enough to insure an
acquittal. See Cohen, supra note 15, at 935.
124. See Neville, 312 N.W.2d at 724-25; Dudley v,. State, 548 S.W.2d 706, 707-08 (Tex. Crim.
App. 1977).
125. Neville, 103 S. Ct. at 922 n.12.
126. Id. at 923.
127. Rhode Island v. Innis, 446 U.S. 291, 302-03 (1980).
128. See Schmerber, 384 U.S. at 761 n.5.
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won't pass the test."
IV. DOYLE v. OHIO AND THE CONSTRAINTS OF DUE
PROCESS
Finally, the Neville Court considered and rejected the due
process argument 29 under Doyle v. Ohio130 that was obliquely raised
in the lower court opinion 31 and mentioned only in passing by
respondent Neville in his brief. 132 In Doyle the Supreme Court
found that a prosecutor had violated a defendant's fourteenth
amendment rights when he used the defendant's post-Miranda
warning silence to impeach him at trial. 133 The Neville Court
recognized that Neville could have similarly argued that his due
process rights were violated by the arresting officer's failure to warn
him that his refusal could be used against him at trial, despite the
statutory requirement that such a warning be given at the time the
test was offered.134
The Court recognized this argument, however, merely to
dismiss it from consideration.13 5 The Court pointed out that the
police specifically told Doyle that his silence was sacrosanct and
that no adverse consequences would flow from that silence. 136 In
contrast, the police informed Neville that his license would be
suspended if he refused the test, 137 thus belying the assumption that
his choice was a "safe harbor," free from attendant penalties. 13 8
Failure to warn Neville that his refusal could itself be admitted at
trial, therefore, was not a fundamentally unfair procedure in
violation of the fourteenth amendment. 139
The Court seems to be on solid ground in such a holding,
129. Neville, 103 S. Ct. at 923-24. The Court considered whether the admission of the
defendant's refusal as evidence violated the defendant's right to due process because police officers
did not fully warn him of the consequences of refusal. Id.
130. 426 U.S. 610 (1976).
131. Neville, 312 N.W.2d at 728. The South Dakota Supreme Court cited Doyle solely for the
proposition thait fle State nav not use a defendant's post-arrest silence lbr any purpose during its
case-in-chief. Id. SeeDoyle v. Ohio, 426 U.S. 610, 619-20 (1976).
132. Brief fbr Respondent at 11, 13, South Dakota v. Neville, 103 S. Ct. 916 (1983).
Respondent Neville, in his brief to the Supreme Court, cited Doyle for the proposition that a
prosecutor may not impeach a defendant by commenting on the defendant's post-Miranda warning
silence. Brief at 13. Neville did not raise the issue addressed by the Court in Neville of whether the
state's failure to warn the defendant that his refusal to submit to a blood alcohol test would be used
against him at trial violated due process. Id.
133. Doyle, 426 U.S. at 619-20.
134. Neville, 103 S. Ct. at 923-24. See S.D. CODIFtED LAWS ANN. § 32-23-10 (1976).
135. 103 S. Ct. at 923-24.
136. Id. at 924. See Doyle, 426 U.S. at 618.
137. 103 S. Ct. at 924.
138. Id. The Court stated that "the warning that he could lose his driver's license made it clear
that refusing the test was not a,'safe harbor,' free of adverse consequences." Id.
139. Id.
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although it was not technically necessary for it to consider the issue.
Doyle is only one in a series of cases in which the Supreme Court has
found a due process violation when the prosecution attempted to
use a defendant's silence to impeach him after he had been
specifically told that his silence could not be used against him. 140
Cases that limit the defendant's right to remain silent, however,
indicate that due process will not protect a defendant's silence at
any stage of the proceedings if he has not been so assured. 141 Thus,
had the arresting officer failed to warn Neville that any adverse
consequences would result from his refusal, due process and a
"sense ofjustice" 42 might have dictated a different result.
V. CONCLUSION
The Supreme Court's decision in Neville is well-reasoned,
legally supportable, and publicly palatable. It comes at a time when
society is becoming increasingly concerned about the devastation
caused by drunk drivers and at a time when the country is calling
for solutions. By what appears to be a definitive disposal of all
constitutional challenges to the admittance of a defendant's refusal
at trial, the Court has laid to rest the conflicting and often
erroneously decided state court decisions on the issue and has
provided law enforcement with an additional tool to prosecute
successfully DWI cases. Although the Court's resolution of the due
process challenge might be controversial because it extends the
rationale of Doyle to a situation in which the defendant was not
warned about the exact consequences that resulted, it is nonetheless
consistent with prior case law and is a legally defensible extension.
Although it is likely that Justice Stevens was in error in finding
an adequate and independent state ground for decision that would
have precluded federal review, 143 his conclusion that the Court was
deciding a federal issue unnecessarily may have some merit: some
state courts, after reviewing-Neville, may choose to recognize a state
140. See, e.g., United States v. Hale, 422 U.S. 171, 180 (1975) (admission of evidence of silence
at the time of the arrest has a significant potential for prejudice); Johnson v. United States, 318 U.S.
189, 196-99 (1943) (due process prohibits a prosecutor from commenting upon a defendant's refusal
to answer certain questions during cross-examination as a result of court bestowed immunity even
though the immunity was improperly granted).
141. See, e.g., Fletcher v. Weir, 455 U.S. 603, 607 (1982) (State properly impeached the
defendant by commenting on the defendant's silence at time of arrest because his silence was not
preceded by Miranda warnings); Jenkins v. Anderson, 447 U.S. 231, 238-40 (1980) (State properly
impeached the defendant by commenting on his failure to report the crime with which he was
charged and to give an explanation of his actions).
142. See Rochin, 342 U.S. at 173.
143. See Neville, 103 S. Ct. at 924 (Stevens, J., dissenting). The majority stated that there was an
adequate but not an independent state ground for the state court decision. Id. at 919 n.5.
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statutory right to refuse testing that is free from constitutional
considerations, thus rendering the Court's decision impotent. It
would be unfortunate, however, if state courts recognized such a
right because the only support for such recognition is a fifth
amendment argument, which the Court has found inapplicable.
The Court has nonetheless rendered a significant decision
concerning the coercion aspect of the fifth amendment and one
whose ultimate ramifications in other constitutional contexts have
yet to be determined.

